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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature Of The Case
This case commenced with a Verified Complaint seeking numerous counts of

defamation and injunctive relief brought by Wanda and Dennis Irish ("the lrishes"). After
the lrishes presented their entire case and rested, Jeffrey Hall and Donna Hall ("the Halls")
moved for a directed verdict, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently the Halls
filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees, which motion was denied by the trial court.

II.

Statement Of Facts
Mr. Hall testified by way of his Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Attorneys' Fees.

(R., Vol. Ill, p. 489)

He testified to his long-tenured ownership of the city's marina,

including restaurant, bar, storefront, and only petroleum pump. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 490) Upon
their purchase of the marina, the Halls experienced immediate harassment from the
community, including from both Mr. and Mrs. Irish. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 490) More specifically,
the Halls had a long-standing dispute with Wanda Irish about the city easement for
parking on the Hall's real property. (R., Vol. 111, p. 490) Wanda Irish, as the elected
mayor, caused the destruction of the Halls' personal property, and said she "was doing
us a favor by not burning them.". (R., Vol. Ill, p. 492-3) As mayor, Wanda Irish insisted
that the Halls' real property was meant to assist the city's other income-producing
endeavors.

(R., Vol. Ill, p. 493-4) Eventually the mayor used her elected office and

openly campaigned against the Halls in the public press and the city's own literature. (R.,
Vol. 111, p. 494, 527-31)
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Mayor Irish eventually signed a complaint and caused it to be filed in district court
against the Halls, proposing to take the Halls' real property by prescriptive easement,
contrary to the plain language of the city's easement. (R., Vol. 111, p. 495-6, 508-516)
Mayor Irish ordered the Halls to remove their personal vehicle off of their own real
property. The sheriff was called and a deputy arrived on the scene and refused to tow
the Halls' personal vehicle or cite them for a law violation as insisted by Mayor Irish. (R.,
Vol. Ill, p. 496) In the Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Kootenai
County sheriff's deputy, Matt Edmonds, testified he received dozens of telephone calls
from Mayor Irish complaining about the Halls. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 576) Deputy Edmonds
personally traveled to Harrison numerous times at the prompting of Mayor Irish. The
I

-j

mayor insisted that the Halls be cited and that their vehicle be towed, and Deputy

i,
I

Edmonds informed her personally that neither could occur and the mayor was noticeably
displeased. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 577)
He never observed an actual violation of the law or disturbance of the peace, and
his conclusion was that it was clear Mayor Irish simply did not like the Halls. Deputy
Edmonds never saw Mr. Hall be rude or use profane language in any of his visit. Id.
Despite the police involvement, the next day the Halls found their personal vehicle
towed from their own property. Mr. Hall confronted Mayor Irish in a City Council meeting.
Mayor Irish agreed to refund the cost of the towing. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 497) When Mr. Hall
failed to receive reimbursement, he protested by placing signs in his vehicle about Mayor
Irish. Id.
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In 2012 the Halls discovered a camera aimed at their store front door, which was
very disturbing to Mr. and Mrs. Hall. Id. Shortly thereafter the Halls discovered several
CCTV cameras placed in and around the city and campground, many of which were
aimed at their business. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 498)
During this time, Mr. Hall had been elected as a city Council member. Id. Mr. Hall
was formerly an electrical contractor in California and very familiar with the exact type of
CCTV camera and system in place throughout the city. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 498) Mr. Hall went
directly to the mayor and city officials for information relating to the CCTV, but was told
by Mayor Irish to make public records request for any of the information regarding the
CCTV. Id.

The Halls made several public records request. Id.

It was eventually

discovered that Dennis Irish purchased, installed, and owned the entire CCTV
system. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 499) Despite their best efforts, the Halls never received any
recorded information from the CCTV system. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 500-01)
In 2013, because of the lrish's behavior, the Halls sought a "No Trespass" order
against Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish with the Kootenai County sheriff's office. (R., Vol.
Ill, p. 502, 577) The sheriff's office delivered the notice of "No Trespass" and within just
a few days again contacted Mr. Irish directly about his alleged violation. Based on Mr.
lrish's admissions, the Kootenai County Sheriff's deputy issued a citation for stalking. (R.
Vol. Ill, p. 577) Thereafter, Wanda lrish's calls continued to the sheriff and they were
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constant, frustrating, without merit, and meant to harass Mr. and Mrs. Hall. (R., Vol. Ill,
p. 577-78)
The Halls published several opinions about Mayor Irish. This included their home
Wi-Fi beam which read: "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking U2". The beam was seen by
no person other than the Iris hes at their personal residence. (Tr., p. 158, L. 10)
The Halls attended mediation regarding their litigation with the City of Harrison in
December 2015, completely resolving the lawsuit. On that same day Mr. Hall agreed and
took down any and all business and personal wireless IDs mentioning the lrishes. (R.,
Vol. Ill, p. 504)
ISSUES ON APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL

1. Did the district court correctly grant the Hall's motion for directed verdict
regarding the statement "Dennis and Wanda stocking U2"?
2. Did the district court err in determining that the Halls were not entitled to
attorney's fees?
3. Are the Halls entitled to attorney's fees on appeal?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I.

Review Of Grant Of Directed Verdict- De Novo

"Whether a directed verdict should be granted is purely a question of law upon
which the parties are entitled to full review by the appellate court without special
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deference to the views of the trial court." Beco Constr. Co. v. Harper Constr., 130 Idaho
4, 7 (1997) (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764 (1986); City of Lewiston
123 Idaho 851,

854

(Ct. App.

1993)).

v.

Lindsey,

"In reviewing the grant or denial of

a directed verdict on appeal, we apply the same standard that governed the trial court's
decision." Id. (citing Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458 (1994); Quick, 111
-

-j

Idaho at 764; Western Stockgrowers Assoc.

v. Edwards, 126 Idaho 939, 941 (Ct. App.

1995); City of Lewiston, 123 Idaho at 854)). "A directed verdict is proper only where the
evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion: that the
moving party should prevail." Lawton

v.

City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458 (1994).

"On appeal, our standard of review is the same." Id.

11.

Review Of Denial Of Attorneys' Fees -Abuse Of Discretion
"The award of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the

burden is on the person disputing the award to show an abuse of discretion ... If there is a
legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded ... " Ross v. Ross, 142
Idaho 536, 539 (Ct.App. 2006)(citing Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho 518, 525
(2001 )).

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Correctly Granted The Motion For Directed Verdict.
The elements for a directed verdict are delineated in Rule 50 of the Idaho Rules of

Civil Procedure. The trial judge based her analysis on Rule 50, stating: "First, in ruling on
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a Rule 50 motion for directed verdict, the trial court must determine whether admitting the
truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to
the opposing party there exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the
jury." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 226, L. 3-8).
To show defamation under Idaho law, the lrishes had the burden of proof to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the Halls: (1) communicated factual information

i
I

concerning the lrishes to others, (2) that the information was defamatory, and (3) that the

!

Iris hes were damaged because of that communication. Clark v. The Spokesman-Review,
144 Idaho 427, 430 (2007). Wanda Irish is a public figure, and it was acknowledged at
trial and in this appeal that she had the additional burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the element of malice. See Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 339 (1977).
"Malice has been generally defined in Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth
or falsity of a statement." Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701 (2000).
The determination of whether a statement is libelous or slanderous per se is
generally a question of law for the court. Bistline v. Eberle, 88 Idaho 473, 478 (1965).
This Court has stated, "If the language used is plain and unambiguous, it is a question of
law for the court to determine whether it is libelous per se. Otherwise it is a question for
the trier of fact." Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 636 (1973). The alleged
defamatory writing must be read and construed as a whole. Id. The words in the statement
are to be given their "common and usually accepted meaning" and should be read and
interpreted as they would be "read and interpreted by the persons to whom they were
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published. 1' Id. (quoting Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 508 (1954)). In
determining whether a statement is libel per se the court must be able to presume as a
matter of law that the statement:
will tend to disgrace and degrade the person or hold him up
to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule or cause him to be
shunned and avoided; in other words, they must reflect on
his integrity, his character, and his good name and standing
in the community, and tend to expose him to public hatred,
contempt or disgrace. The imputation must be one which
tends to affect plaintiff in a class of society whose standard of
opinion the court can recognize.

Weeks, 95 Idaho at 636-637 (quoting Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173, 179
(1952)) (emphasis added).
The lrishes rested their case at trial after calling each other as the only two
witnesses. Viewing all evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to them, not
one of the "Factual Allegations" in the lrish's Verified Complaint (paragraphs 5 through
28), was sufficiently proven. Therefore, the Halls were granted a directed verdict. The
trial judge stated the following in her opinion granting the Halls' motion for directed verdict:
Public figures, including you politicians or political officers, hold
themselves open to public criticism and comment and also have the
means to respond publicly to criticism, and that is why in order to
establish defamation, they must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant knew the information was false or acted
with reckless disregard for its truth at the time the information was
communicated.
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 230, L. 1-19).
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A.

The communication was
Amendment.

opinion and

protected

by the First

The trial judge followed well-established law and held that "Dennis and Wanda
stocking U2" was not" ... anything more than a statement of opinion. And, again, I believe
it's an opinion. I don't believe it's subject to something that can be proven or disproven."
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 239, L. 7-19). This Court has distinguished between fact and opinion in the
context of the First Amendment protection against liability for defamation as follows:
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.
The Supreme Court has also noted the difficulty of determining
whether a statement is one of fact or opinion. See Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct.
1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). One means of differentiating between
fact and opinion in this context has been formulated by the Second
Circuit:
An assertion that cannot be proved false cannot be held
libelous. A writer cannot be sued for simply expressing his opinion
of another person, however unreasonable the opinion or vituperous
the expressing of it may be. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra,
418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997; Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882,
893 (2 nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50
L.Ed.2d 777 (1977).
Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 571 (Idaho 1990), 790 P.2d 347, 352 (Idaho 1990).

The Halls have a constitutionally protected right to criticize the mayor. Their
protected speech included placards in car windows, attending city Council meetings,
running for elected office, and using Wi-Fi ID beams.
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B.

The communication was hyperbole.

Opinions and hyperbole are protected by the First Amendment and beyond the
reach of defamation suits. "Political epithets and hyperbole leveled against the actions of
public officials are within the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment .... "
Hemingway v. Fritz, 96 Idaho 364, 366 (1974). In this matter, the trial judge stated:

And the backdrop of this and the thing I think we really need to keep
in mind is the First Amendment. Speech is protected. Not all
speech, certainly not all speech, but opinions are more protected
than virtually anything else. And political opinions are even more
protected than opinions about other things, or expressions of art, for
example. And this is true even when opinions are offensive and
terribly offensive without sometimes a basis.
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 230, L. 11-19).
In aid of their IRCP 50 Motion, the Halls cited Gardner v. Martino:
In Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9 th Cir.1990), we
held that the threshold question after Milkovich in a defamation claim
is "whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the contested
statement implies an assertion of objective fact." If the answer is no,
the claim is foreclosed by the First Amendment. We use a three-part
test to resolve this question: (1) whether the general tenor of the
entire work negates the impression that the defendant was asserting
an objective fact, (2) whether the defendant used figurative or
hyperbolic language that negates the impression, and (3) whether
the statement in question is susceptible of proved true or false.
Partington, 56 F.3d at 1152 (citing Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1053); see
also Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1075 (noting the three parts for the "totality
of the circumstances" test as (1) the broad context; (2) the specific
context and the content of the statement; and (3) whether the
statement is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true
or false.
563 F.3d 981, 987 (9 th Cir. 2009)
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The trial judge held, "I think it is an exaggeration, I think it's hyperbole, and I don't
think it is actionable defamation ... " (Tr., Vol. 11, p. 236-237, L. 20-1).
In the case of Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., this Court affirmed the use of the
term 'blackmail' as "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet" used by those who
considered the negotiating tactics of a real estate developer to be extremely
unreasonable. Weeks, 95 Idaho at 638 (citing Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n

v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970).
Weeks clarified the nature and use of hyperbole when it addressed an allegedly
libelous newspaper article, stating:
While this article could not be called a classic in English literature, it
is evident that the writer did not intend that it should be taken literally,
but rather as a hyperbole of speech, and it would be so understood
by the ordinary reader. It is not an unusual example of that form of
ribaldry resorted to by a class of writers in describing the acts and
conduct of their rivals or those they seek to criticize, where such
writers have not the necessary skill or cleverness to express
themselves in a more parliamentary manner. The article is an
exemplification of a form of caricature that frequently appears, but in
a more approved and refined form, in the current newspapers of the
day, whereby they attempt to emphasize and set forth the
shortcomings of men prominent in public life, or political parties, or
reform movements against which the writer is seeking to create an
adverse public opinion. Many of these writings and cartoons
appearing in the public press are often useful in creating and
directing public opinion toward needed reforms or the suppression of
evil. If the law should hold all this class of articles, whether by
pictures or writing, actionable per se, without a showing of malice or
pecuniary loss to the party alleged to have been injured, it would so
effectively restrain the press and tend to prevent it from giving the
needed publicity to matters of vital importance to the public welfare
that it would greatly impair one of the most potent influences for good
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we have, for all experience shows that there is no power so great in
suppressing wrong as its pitiless exposure in the public press.

Id. (citing Jenness v. Co-operative Publishing Co., supra, 36 Idaho at 702).

As an everyday example, the statement, "You are killing me!" Is not an assertive
fact that one is homicidal contrary to the law of Idaho, but hyperbole and colloquial
speech. The allegation that the Halls made an assertive fact that Mr. or Mrs. Irish were
committing the crime of stalking fails to recognize that the Halls were engaging in
hyperbole to criticize Mayor Irish. They were not making an assertive fact. The Wi-Fi
beam was a sentence fragment. The phrase lacked any context or details to be perceived
as an assertive fact. It could not communicate with the specificity needed to make a
reasonable person think it was a factual allegation that Mr. and Mrs. Irish:
Knowingly and maliciously engages in a course of conduct that
seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the victim and is such as would
cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress; or
engages in a course of conduct such as would cause a reasonable
person to be in fear of death or physical injury, or in fear of the death
or physical injury of a family or household member.
Idaho Code§ 18-7906(1).

C.

The communication was not actually communicated to a third person.

For a statement to be defamatory it must be communicated to a party other than
the plaintiff in the case (i.e., a third party). Clark, 144 Idaho at 430, (citing Gough, 73
Idaho at 177).
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Only Mr. and Mrs. Irish testified. No member of the community testified they
personally witnessed the communication by the Halls that "Dennis and Wanda stocking
U2." Wanda Irish testified she saw the Wi-Fi beacon "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking
U2" only from her home. (Tr., p. 158, L. 10)
The trial court disregarded the lack of evidence and stated:

-j
I

There is evidence that these statements were seen by others, based
on not only the lrishes testifying that people ask them about it, but as
far as the court is concerned, when I open up my phone and turn to
certain applications, my example would be Pandora, I go to open
Pandora in my office to listen to some music, always a screen pops
up saying do you want to connect to this Wi-Fi, this one, this one, this
one, or this one. It's that same kind of thing. People would have seen
that, there is no question in the court's mind that that would have
been obvious to others.
(Tr., pp. 227-8)

'

The trial court further stated:

... I find it a bit difficult to go along [With the notion that there was a
failure to prove the communication to others] ... what other purpose
would there be to name your Wi-Fi beacon Wanda Irish -- or Mayor
Irish terrorist or Mayor Irish lied, other than to communicate those
words?
(Tr., p. 205, L. 10-23)
However the burden of proof was on the lrishes and the trial court's statement that
"people would have seen that" is an error of law. The trial court incorrectly relieved the
complaining party of its burden of proof, replacing it with judicial presumption and her own
personal experience.
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Wanda Irish testified regarding other allegedly defamatory statements including
Exhibit number 3, "Mayor Wanda Irish terrorist". (Tr. p. 146. L. 11) She also testified she
did not want to go out anymore because she did not want to be asked "questions and
people saying, are you really a terrorist." (Tr. p. 164, L. 3) There was testimony about the
signs in Mr. Hall's vehicle saying "Wanda Irish is a liar," and that people would point to
the signs and question the mayor. (Tr. p. 183, L. 21-25) There was testimony about
"when people asked you about a beacon saying Wanda Irish is a terrorist," (Tr., p. 186,

L. 13-14) and "did anyone come up to you?" "Yeah, when that terrorist thing came out,
yeah." (Tr. p. 189. L. 1-7)
There was no admissible evidence proving by a preponderance that the home WiFi beacon "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking U2" was published to any third party other
than Mr. and Mrs. Irish. Only one witness testified to seeing the Wi-Fi beacon, and that
was Mrs. Irish, at her home. (Tr., p. 158, L. 10) No citizen of the community and no
member of the press testified. The trial court cannot presume any element of the case.
Communication to a third party is an essential element of the cause of action.

D.

The communication was not defamation per se.

When something is alleged to be defamatory per se, the entire utterance must
"considered as a whole in the plain and natural meaning of the words used, and as a
person of ordinary intelligence and perception would understand ... ". Gough, 73 Idaho at
178. "In determining whether a writing or publication is libelous per se, it must be stripped
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of all innuendo, colloquium, and explanatory circumstances. Id., at 179 (quoting Ellsworth
v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 66 N.D. 578, 587 (1936)).

In Barlow

v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 890 (1974), this Court

stated that:
Defamatory utterances regarding an individual are slanderous per
se, that is, actionable without allegation and proof of special
damages, if they fall into one of four categories. One of these
categories comprises utterances which impute "conduct constituting
a criminal offense chargeable by indictment or by information either
at common law or by statute, and of such kind as to involve infamous
punishment (death or imprisonment) or moral turpitude conveying
the idea of major social disgrace." (Cinquanta v. Burdett, 154 Colo.
37, 38 (1963)).

_I

I

This Court in Weeks v. M-P Publications, stated that:
In order to be libelous per se, the defamatory words must be of such
a nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that they will
tend to disgrace and degrade the person or hold him up to public
hatred, contempt, or ridicule or cause him to be shunned and
avoided; in other words, they must reflect on his integrity, his
character, and his good name and standing in the community, and
tend to expose him to public hatred, contempt or disgrace. The
imputation must be one which tends to affect plaintiff in a class of
society whose standard of opinion the court can recognize. It is not
sufficient, standing alone, that the language is unpleasant and
annoys or irks plaintiff, and subject him to jests or banter, so as to
affect his feelings.
Weeks, 95 Idaho at 637 (emphasis added, citing Gough, 73 Idaho at 179).

E.

Wanda Irish failed to meet her burden of proof regarding malice.

Unlike statements between private individuals, statements criticizing public
officials in their official conduct are afforded further First Amendment protection and
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damages are not presumed. New York Times Co, v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84
S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)).

For Mayor Irish to recover for an allegedly

libelous statement, she must show by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hall acted
with malice. Id. (See also Anderson. v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 215-16 (1986)). Malice requires a showing that the
writer knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or
falsity of the statement. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332, 94 S.Ct. 2997
(1974)1. Steele v. The Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,252 (2002) (quoting New York
Times Co., 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686.)

Ill will and a desire to do harm does not meet the actual malice requirement.
Weeks, 95 Idaho at 637.

Actual malice is not defined merely as an evil intent or an improper
motive arising from spite. In a defamation action, actual malice is
proving by clear and convincing evidence the knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of truth. Mere negligence is insufficient; the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the author in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication or acted with a high degree
of awareness of probably falsity.
Clark, 144 Idaho at 431 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The overarching concern in the actual malice standard is the consideration of the
compelling First Amendment interest in debate of public issues and those in government

1 While

New York Times and Gertz were cases involving the media, the protections of these cases were extended to
non-media speakers in Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) ..
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who are in a position to resolve public issues. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
"Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free
discussion. Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest
criticism of government itself be penalized." Id.
In this case, Wanda Irish has failed to submit any admissible evidence to overcome
her clear and convincing burden of proof regarding malice.
II.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Award Attorneys' Fees
To The Halls.
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides in pertinent part:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation. This section shall not alter, repeal or amend any
statute that otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or
political subdivision thereof.
This is in line with the historical view taken by Idaho Courts holding that former I.C.

§ 12-121 should be read together with former section I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), to allow the award
of attorney's fees in those situations in which the Court finds that the action was "brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Ortiz v. Reamy,
115 Idaho 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1989).
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A.

The Halls were the prevailing party and were entitled to attorney's
fees.

In determining whether there is a prevailing party, the Court should first look to
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) which incorporates I.R.C.P. 54d(1)(B) which provides:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought
by the respective parties.
As such, since the Court has ruled in a directed verdict that reasonable minds
could not conclude a verdict in favor of the lrishes, the Halls were the prevailing party in
this action for purposes of costs and attorney's fees.
In considering a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is to accept
the truth of the adverse evidence and every inference that may
legitimately be drawn from the adverse evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. The motion should not be granted
if the evidence is of sufficient quantity and probative value that
reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the
nonmoving party would be proper.
Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 91 (1991), quoting
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-253 (1984).

8.

The lrishes' litigation was unreasonable, frivolous, and without
foundation.

In this case, the lrishes failed on each and every cause of action asserted in their
Complaint.

The Halls prevailed on directed verdict despite the lrish's persistent and

unreasonable efforts to accuse the Halls of defamation.
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i.

All of the lrishes' actions failed to survive even a directed
verdict, which is by definition without foundation.

As stated above, a motion for directed verdict would not be granted if reasonable
minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the non moving party would be proper. Sun
Valley, at 91. Therefore, in granting the directed verdict, the Court already determined

that the lrishes acted unreasonably in pursing their defamation complaint (i.e., reasonable
people could not disagree). Therefore, the trial court should have further found that the
lrish's case was unreasonably pursued and the Halls were entitled to an award of
attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121.
Similar to this case, in Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 659 (1982), the
defendants moved for a directed verdict after the plaintiffs' had rested, and the trial court
granted the directed verdict in favor of the defendants and awarded them attorney's fees
pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. Id. The court concluded on directed verdict that the complaint
was without reasonable foundation. Id. Also similar to this case, the plaintiffs in Anderson
argued against attorney's fees stating that the testimony at trial indicated that the
defendant had in fact committed tortious conduct.

Id.

However, the Idaho Court of

Appeals concluded, "The trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and the
evidence which was introduced. The court concluded that the testimony did not support
such a contention when it stated that the claim was without reasonable foundation and
when it entered a directed verdict in favor of respondent."

Id.

The Appellate Court

affirmed the directed verdict and award of attorney's fees pursuant to§ 12-121.
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ii.

The Verified Complaint signed by the lrishes and their attorney
pied causes of action that were void on their face because of
the statute of limitations.

A defamation claim must be brought within in two years or it is barred by the Statute
of Limitations. Idaho Code§ 5-219(5). The lrishes unwisely pursued several time-barred,
frivolous causes of actions in their Verified Complaint. Even if the lrishes were unaware
of the statute of limitations upon the filing of their Verified Complaint, they were definitely
made aware of the statute of limitations when the Halls filed their Answer to the lrish's
Verified Complaint. Yet the lrishes unlawfully pursued the frivolous causes of actions all
of the way to trial, causing further expense to the Halls.

iii.

The lrishes improperly sought punitive damages.

The Verified Complaint in this matter failed to assert punitive damages, or reserve
the right to move the court for an amendment of the pleadings to include punitive
damages. The lrishes failed to file a pretrial motion.
The lrish's trial preparation included jury instructions on punitive damages, despite
pretrial failure of compliance with I.C. § 6-1604, which requires a motion and order of the
court in order to amend the complaint seeking punitive damages, allowing Defendants to
file an amended answer and possible counterclaim. I.C. § 6-1604(2) states as follows:
In all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted, no claim
for damages shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking
punitive damages. However, a party may, pursuant to a pretrial
motion and after hearing before the court, amend the pleadings to
include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. The court shall
allow the motion to amend the pleadings if, after weighing the
evidence presented, the court concludes that, the moving party has
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established at such a hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts
at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages ...
The lrishes submitted both jury instructions and verdict forms that included claims
for punitive damages. Such actions are contrary to established law and practice, and to
proceed to trial on such errors is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.

I.

The Halls Are Entitled To Attorney's Fees On Appeal.

The Halls seek attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121. The lrishes
acted frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation in law or fact in pursuing this appeal.
See Elliott v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281, 289 (2016).

In Elliot, the Petitioner's original

complaint stated that several of the Respondent's statements defamed her. Id. The
Respondent won on summary judgment, and the Petitioner only appealed a single
statement. Id. This Court stated there was no basis in fact or law for the Petitioner's
claims, and that she had been so instructed by the district court below. "[Petitioner's]
appeal is frivolous and was unreasonably brought. She merely invites us to secondguess the district court's well-reasoned opinion. Accordingly, we award attorney's fees
on appeal to Mr. Murdock per Idaho Code section 12-121." Id.
Attorney's fees should be awarded to the Halls on appeal, because it is established
case law that when:
[S]uch circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the
appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the
evidence or has failed to show that the district court incorrectly
applied well-established law. Further, attorneys fees on appeal have
been awarded under Section 12-121 when appellants 'failed to add
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any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below' that were
resolved by a district court's well-reasoned authority.
Id. Citing Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 645-646 (2012) and Wagner v. Wagner, 160

Idaho 294, 302 (2016).
Similar to the Petitioner in Elliott, in this case the lrishes have failed "to add any
new analysis or authority" to their appeal. Furthermore, the lrishes are asking this Court
to second-guess the trial court's correct application of well-established law. Therefore,
the Halls should be awarded attorney's fees for the lrish's frivolous appeal.

CONCLUSION

The trial court should be affirmed in its directed verdict, and the Halls should be
awarded attorney fees both at trial and on this appeal based on Idaho Code§ 12-121,
and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

DATED this
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-Z-l day of September, 2017.
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